element to land at Inchon.[30]

One week before the operation, MacArthur received a message from the JCS doubting the operation's validity and questioning whether it should be abandoned. MacArthur was thunderstruck. Who could have doubts at this last moment? He immediately replied: "I regard the [operation's] chance of success . . . as excellent. I go further in belief that it represents the only hope of wresting the initiative from the enemy and thereby presenting the opportunity for a decisive blow. . . . There is not the slightest possibility, however, of our forces being ejected from the Pusan beachhead . . . , preparations are proceeding according to schedule. I repeat that I, and all of my commanders and staff officers, without exception, are enthusiastic for and confident of the [enveloping movement's] success."[31]

MacArthur never forgot the need to regain the initiative from the enemy. He kept stressing this point. In hindsight, his judgment was correct. His confidence helped convince President Harry S. Truman and the JCS that the operation could succeed.

MacArthur's confident leadership during this critical time is perhaps his greatest achievement. When others were wilting under the situation's magnitude, MacArthur stood firm in his judgment that the operation would succeed. By emphasizing the operation's major points, he convinced the JCS that his way was best.

On 15 September 1950, MacArthur led the operation to success.[32] His judgment in determining the critical time and place to act and his ability to integrate joint forces in a decisive blow testified to his greatness as a battle commander.

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MR Insights

Thinking Inside the Box: AC/RC Teaming

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Formica, US Army National Guard

Before stepping into the brigade commander's tent for the operation order (OPORD) brief, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Steve Hogan, commander of the 4-324th Infantry, took one last look at the starry sky over Rajastan. Moving into the crowded tactical operations center (TOC), he nodded at acquaintances and friends on the staff, then sat dead center on the front row to get the best look at the situation maps.

Hogan listened as the brigade S2 provided the background information for the upcoming mission: "As you are aware, the United States, in support of United Nations (UN) resolutions, has provided the 2d Brigade, 11th Infantry Division, Light, as part of a stability and support operation in the Republic of Rajastan, a former Soviet central-Asian republic. Recent economic and religious instability has caused the government coalition to collapse, and the military has split along factional lines. This brigade, the lead element of the UN force, deployed to an intermediate staging base (ISB) near Plovda airfield, a former Soviet air base approximately 80 kilometers from the capital city of Tamarkand."

"That was a week ago," thought Hogan. "What next?"

Hogan perked up when he heard the intelligence officer's next comment: "We have confirmed that the 54th Rajastan Motorized Rifle Brigade, with elements of a tank battalion, has linked up with rebel forces in Tamarkand. We expect them to move down Highway 1 to seize Al Sharif within 24 hours." Al Sharif was a road junction about 50 kilometers from Plovda on the main road to Tamarkand.

The brigade S3 began his brief: "The 2d Brigade will deploy one battalion within 12 hours to Al Sharif and secure routes to the ISB and prevent enemy armor from disrupting airfield operations. This battalion will be prepared to defend not later than (NLT) 0600 tomorrow."

"That's about 11 hours from now," thought Hogan. "Someone's going to move 30 miles, then set up

a defense on open terrain to defend against tanks."

Hogan did not know whether the brigade had enough trucks to move everyone, but he knew available airlift was insufficient. Also, defending against armor would require time to dig in and improve positions.

"The commander has selected 4th Battalion for this mission," continued the brigade operations officer.

Hogan's hand shot up. The operations officer continued, "Steve, before you ask for support, let me tell you that the commander has also attached the 2d Battalion, 114th Regiment, to you for this mission."

That answered a lot of Hogan's questions. He glanced over at LTC Bill Garrett, the 2-114th commander. Garrett said, "My executive officer (XO) is speaking to your staff right now about the move. We should be ready to roll in about 3 hours."

Without having to ask, Hogan had received plenty of information. The 2d Battalion, 114th Regiment, was a US Army National Guard (ARNG) outfit with which his unit had been teamed during the Guard unit's weekend drills and annual training (AT). Hogan knew his light infantry dismounts, working with the vehicle's ARNG crews, could quickly and efficiently execute the well-rehearsed load plans.

The unit was equipped with the Army's latest light armored vehicles (LAVs) and was designed to move and support light infantry. The unit included all battlefield operating systems (BOS) necessary for it to transit the 50 kilometers with time to spare. Hogan was also fully aware that the pedestal-mounted HELLFIRE and tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided antitank missiles (TOW) on the vehicles would add a lot of punch to the positions he would establish. They would also allow him to quickly redeploy his troops to counter any enemy efforts to bypass his positions.

The next afternoon, while in position at Al Sharif, Hogan thought about what his troops had accomplished with the mobile unit's help. Turning to Garrett, Hogan quipped, "Bill, not that we couldn't have marched all this way and dug in in 12 hours, but I was sure glad your people were here to lend a hand."

"We don't want to complain, Steve, but none of your guys left a tip," grinned Garrett.

"Seriously, Bill, when I first heard of your unit, I thought it was another medium brigade, like the Army has at Fort Lewis, Washington, or like the Guard has in Vermont. I didn't realize just how different your unit is."

"Well, it takes some getting used to, Steve, but the unit's whole purpose is different. Too few ARNG units made it to the box as anything other than opposing-force (OPFOR) augmentation or as support units. The cost and tempo of training made it difficult to gear up the average combat arms unit in the time available to operate as blue force units at the training centers. Only after folks seriously thought about leveraging ARNG strengths were units such as this one developed."

"So your unit was a product of inside-the-box thinking?" Hogan joked.

"Yeah, I guess so," Garrett responded.

New ARNG Force Structure

The "mobility assault unit," a concept formation different from any the US Army has contemplated, involves no change to current light division or brigade structure. Instead, it leverages the strength that results from teaming light units with ARNG mobility battalions.

The issue is the proposed new ARNG force structure that would:

- Fully integrate Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) force structures into a deployable force mix as part of a multicomponent force.
- Use existing ARNG personnel and force structure.
- Provide increased mobility for a light force.
- Increase the lethality of current light divisions and brigades without requiring major structural modification.

Defining the Problem

Increased operating tempo (OPTEMPO), limited resources and the changing nature of the threat affect doctrinal evolution, equipment design and training issues, which involve all Army elements. The ARNG maintains eight combat divisions in deep strategic reserve. Recruiting for these units is difficult. Their training requirements are hard to meet because of personnel turnover, lack of resources and inadequate facilities.

Light infantry divisions can deploy quickly but lack tactical mobility, protection and firepower. These deficiencies were major concerns during the initial stages of Operation *Desert Shield*. AC and RC training has not been truly integrated in tactical, multicomponent units, although the Army has begun placing headquarters units with enhanced brigades. Because of budget constraints, training in vehicles has been severely limited. Operational costs for an AC vehicle greatly exceed RC costs (more use for the same series).

US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) has recommended an ARNG heavy, enhanced, separate brigade for conversion to the medium concept. The brigade would continue to face the same obstacles of time, money, recruiting and resourcing as current troop-heavy units. Using the mobility assault unit approach would enable the ARNG to become a contingency "player" and fill the need for light infantry.

The proposed unit would enable Army planners to selectively augment or enhance light infantry, depending on employment options. For example, a latest-arrival date (LAD) of less than 30, or a force support package (FSP) ARNG unit, maintains high-cost vehicles at less cost per mile and provides vehicle commanders, drivers, and self-sustaining logistic and selected command and control (C^2) personnel. The unit is merged with the supported formation for varying periods depending on mission. Placing vehicles with the Reserve Component for long-term use defrays costs and allows the ARNG to leverage equipment proficiency.

The ARNG, with fewer personnel and a battle-focused mission-essential task list (METL), can operate and maintain armored vehicles at considerable savings. The Active Component and ARNG light infantry

can continue to focus on fitness and technical proficiency in light infantry skills, with ARNG medium-force training focused on maintaining and operating assigned vehicles while sustaining personal fitness and skills. This arrangement gives Army planners newer, more flexible capabilities.

The 17 August 1998 coordinating draft of FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, *Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Training Association Program,* says, "Teamed units keep their individual identity and mission but together provide the Army a broader base from which to choose in meeting the diverse challenges associated with our capabilities-based force. By looking at units in teamed pairs, the Army is better able to meet requirements across the full spectrum of military operations. Support between teamed units is typically provided in unit packages at 'a level of organization but could be adjusted according to mission requirements.'"

Planning Considerations

Versatility. Versatility calls for organizations that will, with minimal adjustment in minimum time, generate formations that can dominate at any point on the battlefield. The options for unit deployment would include:

- Pure light deployment. Light forces would only deploy into a situation requiring infantry with limited mobility or in situations requiring utmost strategic speed.
- Mobile-assault deployment. The force would deploy as a multicomponent unit and would have greater mobility and combat capability.
- Ground-lift deployment. The commander could deploy an AC or enhanced brigade with limited ARNG mobility assets, such as one mobility battalion to a light infantry brigade—much as helicopter lift assets are currently assigned.
- Building-block deployment. This option would be a light deployment with separate medium deployment after augmentation as separate entities. Enabling this strategy would require building entirely new medium units, perhaps using the ARNG medium cadre as the initial structure. For instance, units could merge with a light "integrated" division to form a motorized unit.

Lethality. Lethal combat power elements include maneuver, leadership and protection. Adding LAV and the future combat system would enhance all three areas by providing greater capability for maneuver and increased force protection. The LAV produced for the US Marine Corps includes a C^2 version, a 25-millimeter cannon variant, a TOW carrier and a mortar carrier. Augmentation with an armored gun system (AGS) or LAV-600, such as the Cadillac Gage variant armed with a gyro-stabilized, low-recoil, 105-millimeter gun, would greatly increase the force's potential striking power.

Digital systems. As related to situational awareness, such vehicles would help the commander use the Global Positioning System (GPS) and In-Vehicle Information System (IVIS). There also is a Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System (MEWSS) LAV variant that can provide communication, data-collection and electronic-warfare capabilities to the force.

Survivability. Technology must provide maximum protection to the individual soldier. Speed and mobility will allow increased force protection over current levels.

Sustainability. The force can reduce its logistic footprint and replenishment demands. The LAV, weighing approximately 20 tons, would pose less strain on the logistic system than an Abrams tank or Bradley Fighting Vehicle.

Strategic dominance. The force must dominate throughout the spectrum of joint, combined and multinational operations. Javelin-equipped infantry transported in TOW-equipped LAVs can fight and survive.

Strategic responsiveness. To be strategically responsive, the force must be able to deploy anywhere quickly, perhaps using forward-deployed forces and pre-positioned equipment.

Vehicle use. The medium force can use any vehicle—the General Motors LAV, the M113 or any other light vehicle.

Training Responsibilities

Active light infantry and ARNG mobility components could train independently to specific responsibilities, with combined training possible during inactive duty training (IDT) and annual training. The ARNG and AC could team units in habitual relationships for efficiency.

With fewer occupational specialties and missions, the ARNG unit could better focus training resources and requirements. Recruiting for a smaller unit with a real-world mission would be less of a burden. This formation also would allow the ARNG to keep unit designations, while affording the Active Component better integration, efficiency and effectiveness.

The unit could add a mobile assault element for a specific mission or be permanently integrated into another unit. This flexibility gives planners new options. The unit has a limited deployment tail designed for minimum equipment, so light infantry can carry more equipment with increased mobility.

Structure can be augmented with TOW, mortar, maintenance, medical and logistic carriers. LAV variants exist to support these capabilities. Activating additional ARNG battalions would offset the reduced number of soldiers per transformed unit, so the ARNG could retain its end number of soldiers.

Training to standard. Each component would train to standard independently. Teaming would occur on selected collective tasks during the ARNG unit's weekend drills and annual training for LANES. FORSCOM Regulation 350-4 says, "Teaming is conducted within existing laws, regulations and policy. It acknowledges but does not supplant other programs, responsibilities or relationships. . . . Teamed units should train together, when practical, in events that leverage their operational-support capabilities. . . . [And,] teamed units typically co-participate in training exercises, send representatives to participate in each others' Battle

Command Training Program and *exchange crews/teams for collective training events* (emphasis added)."

Implementation. Near-term (within 2 to 3 months) implementation would entail:

- Identifying AC or enhanced-brigade light infantry units and ARNG mechanized units to test various concepts.
- Using IDT for train-up and concept testing during LANES designed by the training support brigade (TSB) for annual training. The training would include operations at an aerial port of embarkation (APOE) and aerial port of debarkation (APOD), deployment and METL development.
- Identifying available vehicles such as PANDUR, LAV, M113 or others.

In the midterm (within 4 to 6 months), implementation would entail:

- Conducting IDT LANES in pure forms for each element and becoming familiar with the other.
- Conducting IDT and AT teaming and training with LANES evaluation by the TSB as the culminating event and, if feasible, load out platoon-size elements using forward logistic sites (FLS).

In the long term (within 7 to 12 months), implementation would entail:

- Identifying units for conversion to mobile assault units and activating additional units as needed.
- Forming light infantry or ground-lift teams to begin habitual relationships.

The end state, then, is to:

- Add value to the force with minimal expense by leveraging component strengths.
- Provide strategic capability for force planners.
- Validate teaming and the total-force concept.

Incentives. With the decreased funding per battalion, when considered against the present cost of maintaining mechanized units, proficiency pay can be considered for the approximately 260 soldiers in the unit. Special badges or tabs could also be a symbol of unit pride.

Resource Implications

Resource implications include the cost per RC soldier, which is approximately one-third the cost of the AC counterpart. Increased force protection, mobility, deployability and lethality for AC and RC soldiers are worth the effort.

According to FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, "The primary impetus for Army teaming is to maximize contributions of the ARNG and USAR in execution of National Military Strategy and to replicate the cohesiveness of AC/RC unit relationships that existed with Cold War-era CAPSTONE alignments, but updated to reflect the demands and missions of a capabilities-based force. The goal is to strengthen the Army's ability to respond across the full spectrum of military operations—from state/domestic to multinational/worldwide requirements."

Active Component and ARNG units newly nominated to convert to the medium concept will encounter the same familiar obstacles of manning, equipping, funding and training. A more focused and limited approach would help the ARNG quickly become a "player." This is its opportunity to think about getting into the box to provide an asset that is needed, deployable and affordable.

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The 75th Ranger Regiment: A Tactical Force With Strategic Implications

Colonel P.K. Keen, US Army, and Major Dominic J. Caraccilo, US Army

The erosion of the bipolar spheres of interest between the former Communist Block and Western nations and the resulting power vacuum continue to foster regional instability that has strategic ramifications. This instability is compounded by the globalization and interdependence of:

- Regional interests.
- Regional arms races.
- Rising economic and social expectations.
- Pan-nationalism.
- Re-emergence of ethnic and tribal conflicts.
- Population growth.
- Urbanization.
- Global competition for limited resources.
- Pandemic and environmental disasters.
- Disparity in wealth.
- Rapid social and technological change.

Today's security environment is dynamic, uncertain and challenging. Global concerns include ethnic conflict and outlaw states that threaten regional stability; terrorism; organized crime syndicates; environmental damage; and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[1]

The projected future strategic environment will have fewer wars but more conflict.[2] The synergistic effect of such conditions creates opportunities for state and nonstate actors to disrupt US pursuit of its goals and objectives.

Existing threat environments hold sobering implications for US forces. By 2010 more than 70 percent of the world's population will be living in